

RESISTANCE

DL XI, NO 2

AN ANARCHIST BI-MONTHLY

OCTOBER, 1953

Americans from Korea

"An amazing amalgam of first-class fighting competence and an almost eerie disinterest in a job or surroundings or relationships"

"disquieting, machine-like products of their special time"

"again before a television screen, or back again with his wife and few-months-old baby...staring nowhere, as though he were waiting, just waiting"

"an almost robot-like disinterest"

This is the way George Barrett, one of the ablest correspondents in Korea, attempts to characterize the million and a half veterans of this war, in "Portrait of the Korean Veteran" (*New York Times Magazine*, Aug. 9, 1953).

Lest it be thought this is only one man's view, we cite from the *Times*, Sept. 14 ("Veterans of Korea Flock to Colleges under U. S. Grants," by Benjamin Fine):

"The observation made by Yale University is typical of that given by other institutions: 'There is a tremendous difference between the veterans of World War II and of the Korean War. The World War II veterans were more aggressive, more interested in world affairs and more interested in local university and community affairs. The enormous growth of the International Relations Department in the period immediately following World War II was due chiefly to the interest of the veterans in these subjects. The Korean veteran is entirely different, being more passive. He seems anxious to slip back quietly into the regular civilian student life without any "fanfare."'"

To return to Barrett's portrait "He is, in a word, disjointed, as he was in Korea. . . . The veteran who was dulled by a conflict whose dimension he didn't understand as a soldier, finds today as a civilian that he still doesn't understand."

This soldier-generation, Barrett observes, possesses little of the boisterous aggressiveness of the "typical" GI of the second World War. In the present group, three traits stand out: timidity-politeness, passivity, and fatalism.

"Many of the new veterans wear their hesitancy almost like a uniform, they are polite, even timid." The veteran "starts with 'sir,' he interlaces 'sirs' in his conversation as though they were substitutes for punctuation, and he winds up with a 'sir' that would paralyze Willie and Joe."

Typically, the veteran gives the impression of being a man waiting for orders, ready to do whatever he is expected to do. "Those who are dealing every day with the men back from Korea share the impression that many of the new ex-servicemen expect to be told what to do." Says a Veterans Administration official, "It's as though, when they come in here they're not just looking for help or information, but for orders again. Many times they don't even show any expression; they just look at you and wait to be told what to do." If, as is the rule, they avoid any trace of military gear, "this doesn't seem to come from any strong desire to erase the last vestige of military service. Rather . . . it's as though they were ready to put on worsteds simply because this is expected of them in their new roles."

In Korea, Barrett says, the soldiers convey the "astounding impression" of remaining "untouched by their experiences." Unlike soldiers of previous wars, they felt no identification with their "outfit"; they lacked the old drive to tear equipment apart to see what makes it tick; they seemed to meet everything from unwelcome patrol duty to an amputation with an unemotional "That's the way the ball bounces." Now, home again, the veteran "gives the impression that he has not yet caught up with himself, that although he makes the motions and has the looks of a jobholder and husband and father he is being motivated not from within himself but by external forces. The appearance is there, so to speak, but not the reality."

2.

The psychology Barrett describes seems to us to have many deep implications; but first let us follow out his analysis. The soldier's dullness and apathy can be explained partly, he believes, by the fact that the Americans

sent to Korea have been a rather special group. Many of them—more than a third even in the latter stages of the war—were Regular Army men, that is, men who had chosen to withdraw from the “competitive challenge of non-army life”; such men would, he thinks, tend to set the tone of the whole army. The draftees were, by comparison with the previous war, extremely young, and frequently they were the victims of the “educational deferment” process by which the “smarter youths” avoided conscription. The soldier is, therefore, “not a man who has had a full share of educational and economic breaks, and therefore his negativism might be overdrawn.” And their youth would have this effect: “Being still unsure of himself now, he is perhaps inclined therefore to assume that all’s in accordance with experience and authority, and that there is nothing to challenge, at least until the challenger can come up with something of his own. Which he seems to feel that he cannot.”

This special group of young Americans, then, was confronted with a very special war. They could not but feel and share the bewilderment and apathy of the folks at home—and share it in a very intense way: “An impressive library of books could be made up of the tons of paper used by generals and admirals and public information specialists and visiting Congressmen trying to explain the reason for the Korean War to the guy fighting it. But he [the guy] didn’t get it. And he still doesn’t.”

In addition, Barrett believes, the possibility of *esprit de corps*, of a sense of “belonging,” was blocked by the peculiar replacement system in Korea.

3.

The casualty lists for dead, wounded and missing record 140,000 names. “Each ten in the ranks is less by one.” Is there perhaps some category, in some list of human casualties, for these “typical” of the million and a half, shocked into apathy, “robot-like disinterest,” half-men? “And then there were none.”

4.

Barrett was a sensitive observer, and his description has the mark of authenticity. Certainly the soldiers’ “ignorance” about the war is attested by many observers. It is hard to think of any war in which the soldiers were so unwilling to accept the official explanation—and so unable to find one of their own.

One would expect those who believe in democracy to be shocked by this very public fact—but they seem to manage to ignore its significance.

If it is true that the soldiers do not even *understand*—let alone, believe in—the idea of the war, what has become of America’s claim to superiority because its government represents the “will of the people”? It turns out that this war, with its dead, has been fought—not only without expression of any popular will, not only without persuading the populace of its rightness, but even without the government’s being able to make the people understand what the war was about.

It is notorious that the foreign policies of all governments are autocratic—but believers in American democracy must come to terms with the fact that in this case the American government has acted with the irresponsibility of the Russian government.

Why this “can’t understand”? The idea of the war—to read the editorials and the statesmen—was not so difficult. America was going to pin down every Communist effort at expansion, without total war (the policy of containment). Once the American version was accepted—that North Korea had attacked without any provocation—once the Russians and Chinese were labeled the only evil nations in the world, it should not have been hard to “understand” the American Idea.

But the soldiers “did not understand.” One can only conclude, they did not want to understand, they found the idea unacceptable, some of its premises were “unsatisfactory.” Which ones? I think we might guess at their objections: “If we’re going to have a war, why not try to win it?” Or, “It’s all right—except for us fellows who have to sit over here in Korea and be shot at.” Or “What in the hell do we want with Korea—let ’em have it.”

In short, the American soldiers would have “understood” if they were told, “We’re going to try to destroy Russia and China, because they are aggressors.” Or, if they were told, “We’re all going home.”

The implications of this situation are many. Here we want to underline one aspect: That as America embarks deeper and deeper into its commitments to be a world power, to engage in *Realpolitik*, its foreign policy must become increasingly autocratic. When we underscore this fact, we underscore the failure of democracy, the impossibility of even the formal kind of “popular control” that many imagine still exists in America. It means that those who find something in the ideas from which the democratic institutions derived, must think in terms of how America’s situation as a State in a world of States-at-war can be radically changed.

5.

Barrett’s interpretation is incomplete, however. He seems to suggest that the soldiers’ apathy is a direct response to a bewildering and confusing situation. On the contrary, it is a truism that the bored and apathetic person is really deeply interested in something—something so important that everything else wearies him, and so dangerous that he dare not think about it. Set a man in a maze, the acme of a bewildering and confusing situation, and his first, spontaneous reactions are flight and efforts to attack and destroy the maze. Only when he feels his efforts defeated and helpless, does he surrender to apathy.

The excessive politeness Barrett describes is an additional clue to the soldiers’ emotions. Politeness is, of course, a convenient way to keep up some kind of social relations without going to any trouble. But a person

RESISTANCE

Vol. 11, No. 2 October, 1953

Editors: Resistance Group

Secretary: D. WIECK

Resistance, an anarchist review, is supported solely by voluntary contributions. Subscriptions are free on request. Articles are invited from our readers; the opinions expressed in signed articles are not necessarily those of the editors.

IMPORTANT: Make all money orders and checks payable to Resistance Magazine, Box 208, Cooper Station, New York 3, N. Y.

usually adopts this particular mask when his true feelings are quite the opposite—namely, rage and violent aggression. The ex-soldier, his politeness suggests, is a furious man who has spent a couple of years learning to swallow his rage.

A soldier—any soldier—is an angry man—he is angry at being a soldier, he is angry at those luckier than he, and his superiors more or less deliberately keep him enraged. In the usual wars, the army turns this anger to practical account, in battle. Even in “ordinary” wars, however, there is always too much of it and it spills over into “gripping” and hatred of the officers. In the peculiar war in Korea, this restrained and limited war, this war without any aims—victory, national salvation, national greatness—that the soldier could understand and make his own, the soldier’s anger could not be vented in battle, it could find no acceptable object.¹

Superficially, these are conditions for rebellion—except for the peculiar selection of the troops. (And except also, perhaps, for a certain number of courts-martial.) As Paul Goodman wrote of the establishment of educational deferments by competitive examinations, “Within the armed forces the chasm between men and officers will be broadened. Up to now among the unwilling draftees were many at least the equals of the college-trained officers. This situation provided centers of literate griping and articulate criticism that slightly alleviated the brutalizing subordination.” (*Resistance*, April, 1951) The very young man, the less successful man, the already apathetic Regular Army man, fed into Korea by a pipe-line that cut off identification with other soldiers, waiting for his own personal “rotation” date—this man *endured it all*, he did not rebel, he put the thought of rebellion out of his mind, he even

¹From certain soldiers’ letters, one suspects that, in the course of the war, the Chinese soldier became, in the American soldier’s eyes, increasingly human—a man in fundamentally the same plight as himself.

Tourist-Land

To Americans, Spain is now very famous as the “cheapest country in Europe” to spend a vacation. “We suggest to these tourists,” says *CNT* of Toulouse, “that they insist on seeing the jails and prisons, and the cellars of the police headquarters, and the torture chambers of Francoist Spain. Everywhere they will see the living testimony of martyrdom, the indelible traces of torture.”

On July 4, 5, 6 and 7, by a series of arrests, by the savage torture of victims until they furnished “information,” the Franco police arrested 22 members of the anarcho-sindicalist CNT in Barcelona; seized the plant where *Solidaridad Obrera* was being clandestinely published; seized the treasury of the Food Workers Syndicate (some \$5,000). Two of the arrested men, Jesus Longas Casanovas and Francisco Hernández Diaz, have gone insane from torture.

These facts speak for the vitality of the resistance in Spain, in its vanguard the anarchists. Again and again, the fascists have “smashed” the CNT, but the underground organization continues to function.

put his anger out of his mind. He is the apathetic man of whom Barrett writes.²

6.

Assuming that Barrett’s facts, and the present interpretation, are correct, there is something here to think about. The World War II GIs’ aggressive concern to get back into civilian life was a good sign—at least relatively. They have not been a particularly militaristic group, indeed have rather quickly lost their veterans’ identity. If the Korean veterans are as described, their influence on America may be very different, and not very salutary.³

The apathetic man is waiting—as Barrett says—for someone to give him orders. But he is waiting for *particular* orders—the orders to release the buried sentiments in action. Unless Barrett’s portrait is overdrawn, these men seem to resemble the “front generation” of old Germany—the men who were denied the victory they had been promised, the men who flocked to the Nazi ideology of paranoia. If the resemblance is very close, the war in Korea may exact indirectly from this country a far greater price than any yet paid; and those who care about our future had better accelerate the “waging of the peace” in our society.⁴

David Wieck.

²It is possible that the very locale of the war—and the particular enemy—contributed to the final reaction of fatalism, politeness, passivity. These are, as the American soldiers could see, the classical adaptation of orientals—the Koreans and Japanese they saw, the Chinese they imagined—to societies where the soldiers’ two-year fact is a lifelong fact.

³Particularly if their reaction is really only an exaggeration of the “cool character” so noticeable among the civilian youth, in New York at least.

⁴If my recollections of the book are not mistaken, the soldiers of Remarque’s *The Road Back* are close kin to those Barrett describes.

For an inkling of the fate of the 22—whose only crime is that of exercising the “right” of association and publishing—we quote from a letter from Spain, published in the *CNT* of Sept. 6:

“The State proposes to destroy the CNT, and kill its men, but what has it been able to do? Everything they have tried has failed, because an idea that permeates a whole country is immortal—they would have to kill the Spanish people.

“To locate the National Committee of the CNT! But where is it? They thought they had found it in Barcelona in this latest assault, but they didn’t even find the Catalan Regional Committee . . .

“All means are good, to get a confession,” “Torture them till they confess,” these are the orders of the government. Beatings are administered methodically, sadistically, with Gestapo coolness. Night, the cover of assassins, is the stage for this indescribable brutality. Eight against one, drunk with blood and alcohol, the police set upon the defenseless man. It is a Dantesque canvas of beast and man.

“Legal procedures—orderly questioning—72 hours’ maximum police detention—all this is a fiction in Spain, though the falangists proclaim it in the international legal congresses.

“Picture the fate of the arrested man. It goes on for

days, weeks and months that are part not of life but of death. The incommunicado is absolute, not even the prisoner's family knows where he is. When he is at last handed over to the judicial authorities, they won't inquire about the date he was arrested—it does not interest them, nor do the police allow interference. It will be useless for him to show the judge his shoulder black from blows, his broken ribs, punctured lung, or broken arm. Nothing interests them except the printed, illegible, trembling signature at the bottom of the charges, the 'confession' extracted by torture.

"The role of the police does not end even here. Legally, the 'labor' of the police is ended when the man is turned over to the judicial authorities. But not in Spain. The judge is nothing, he is merely the instrument of the police who legalizes their actions. For an indefinite time, sometimes the length of the trial, the arrested man remains at the disposition of the specialists in torture.

"Against the militants of the CNT, they have tried everything from twisting the genitals to pulling out fingernails, from the most refined 'scientific' beatings to the most barbaric...."

The New York Times of Sept. 21 reports "U. S. Pacts Await Franco Approval; Base Rights and Two Related Agreements Will End Talks That Started Last Year." "... the United States Government refrained from pressing for any terms that might have implied a desire to see a change in the present authoritarian structure of the Franco regime." "... Plans were being studied to make an initial delivery to Spain of \$50,000,000 worth of military weapons and other material."

For the Clandestine Press

Because of the grave situation, and as an answer to Franco's claims to have destroyed the CNT, SOLIDARIDAD OBRERA, organ of the Spanish CNT in France, is conducting a campaign to raise a million francs (\$3,000) for the "clandestine press" in Spain. Contributions may be sent to A. Garcia, 24, rue Sainte-Marthe, Paris X, France.

"A report [to the conference of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO] by a group of educators on the mobilization of science and technology denounced the 'barriers' placed in the way of scientists who travel or exchange views with others of their profession abroad.... The report, in noting a trend toward increasing isolation in science, said that studies of bibliographies in United States scientific publications showed a tendency to mention only domestic research reports. Ignorance of foreign literature leads to wasteful duplication of work, the educators held, and scientific nationalism leads to international misunderstanding.... An illustration of the 'cultural isolationism' found in this country was offered by one of the speakers, Mitoji Nishimoto, Professor of Education at the International Christian University, Tokyo, who said two years were required to get clearance to translate several American books on education into Japanese." Minneapolis, Sept. 16, Benjamin Fine, *N. Y. Times*.

Lessons of a Strike

"Monsieur le president du Conseil:

"In your radio broadcast of August 17, you put to the workers the question: 'Are you willing to have your demands met in counterfeit money?'"

"After consulting our comrades we are in a position to answer you as follows:

"Considering, on the one hand, that the 25,000 francs (\$75) monthly increase, retroactive four months, which the deputies and you have granted themselves, can be paid only in 'counterfeit money';

"Considering, on the other hand, that the three billions released in the last few days to increase police salaries (obtained without a strike) can also be paid only in 'counterfeit money';

"Our comrades say they are ready to take this 'counterfeit money,' because they are sure that what enables some to enjoy expensive vacations ought to enable others to provide decently for their wives and children."

Postal strike committee, Paris 17
—From *Le Libertaire*, 8-27

¹I.e., money devalued by inflation.

An old aphorism is attributed to a revolutionary leader: "There goes the mob, I am their leader, I must follow them." But it is necessary to add: "I must rush to the head of the column, and slow down their march, and finally stop it."

If ever there was a lesson in trade-union leadership! The spontaneous unity of the French workers—socialists, communists, Christians and non-political—transformed protests and demonstrations into a powerful general strike. In order to keep control, the officials of the "centrals" followed along, occasionally issuing a back-to-work order, occasionally rejecting the government's demands. But in the end the socialist and Christian leaders betrayed the strike by accepting miserly concessions and abandoning the strikers' goal—rescinding of the Laniel decrees, convocation of the Assembly. The Communist leaders of the CGT, guided as always by the Russian needs of the moment, had offered the strikers only mild encouragement, lest chances for a French-Russian rapprochement be upset.

Perhaps never has there been a strike where the workers' demands were so just and elementary, for the Laniel decrees, attempting to "balance the budget" at the workers' expense, were the rawest kind of class legislation. Yet the strike was "against the government"—as the government was against the workers—and this was too much for the union leaders.

Like a revolution, such a strike begins spontaneously, here and there, as the workers' patience is exhausted. Like

a revolution, it must organize its means of co-ordination, independent of all existing organizations, before too late: in the case of a revolution, to organize production and distribution, in the case of a general strike, to achieve agreement on demands. As in a revolution, even these spontaneous organizations may be too timid, and the situation may outrun the demands of 24 hours before. But the French workers did not progress beyond local strike committees, the demands were never unified, the officials of the "centrals" could continue to negotiate in the name of their members, and begin after three weeks to enforce their back-to-work orders.

Nevertheless, the display of unity among French workers is a heartening sign on a continent sick with Capitalism and Communism.

For Americans, the strike makes clear the nature of the Capitalism this government is defending. American leaders are given to talking of how much better off the workers are under Capitalism, how they will rescue Asia's millions by bringing them Capitalism. In what other major country besides America do the workers have more than bare subsistence? Would it perhaps be France?

No, it would not be France:

"First, there was the cost of living combined with wage scales that even in ancient times of a stable franc have never permitted the French working class to keep more

than a few steps ahead of poverty. With a cheapened franc the race is now neck and neck."

The low standard of living "is seen in budgets that stretch so thin between one monthly pay and another that they often break and leave a family living on cheap bread, soup and potatoes for the last two or three days of the monthly grind. And it is seen in the fact that there is little money for clothes (many families make their clothing at home), that gas, electricity and the tri-monthly rent bills present problems of financial ingenuity for harassed housewives, that ordinary distractions such as movies are rare and some months non-existent.

"It is seen in the dilapidated apartments filled with simple furniture or in hovels and hotel rooms where families live cramped together because there is a housing shortage and those with the least money get the least housing. It is seen in the fact that the refrigerator is a luxury that is not only out of reach of the working class but is a difficult object for middle-class families to acquire."

"No Government [of the 17 since January, 1947] has been able to push seriously long-range reforms.... The tax system, unable to draw sufficient revenues from direct levies on the moneyed French, falls back on the easy method of indirect taxation of almost every consumer product and service. Prices, of course, reflect the moves immediately." (From a dispatch to *The Times*, Aug. 15, by Henry Giniger.)

The Law, Its Majesty

"Stephen Stanley Reagan, aged 58, who chooses to be known as Michael Patrick O'Brien... boarded the ferry in Portuguese Macao two days short of a year ago without passport or papers. He said he was an American, but the Justice Department in Washington said he was not. So far as anyone knows, he is Hungarian. For 315 days he ferried between Macao and Hong Kong. During one stop last December he told *The Times* correspondent, Henry R. Lieberman, that he had spent most of his years in the United States in reform schools and jails until he was deported in 1931. He came out of Communist Shanghai.

"Nobody wanted him until one day (July 30 of this year) he was permitted to land in Hong Kong, only to be whisked off by plane to Genoa with a landing permit for Brazil, where his White Russian wife had gone. The liner Bretagne took him to Rio de Janeiro last month, but the authorities said no. At Marseille earlier this week the French said no. Back to Genoa yesterday the Italians refused. Now the man who shuttled the fifty-mile stretch between Macao and Hong Kong for ten months seems doomed to the long voyage from Genoa to Rio to Genoa—for how long?"—From the *New York Times* editorial "The Wanderer," of Sept. 16.

Housing: I. "There Was Some Criticism...."

"President Defends Housing Fund Cuts"—headline in *The Times* (Aug. 20).

"There was some criticism, I think, a minute ago about the exact size of the appropriations made this year by the Federal Government for housing. I don't go along with that too much for this reason: There are many vicissitudes

in the pulling and hauling and arguments of free government, but there is certainly, if anyone knows the heart of America, you can't go to them and show them that great bodies of citizens are living in hovels, unfit habitations and not get help—help expressed not only from their private purses, as Mr. Baruch has done, but through official channels of appropriations.

"But let us never forget what is government? Government is people and people are you. We can't sit here and transfer our responsibility to some vague sort of entity that we refer to as a Washington government."—President Eisenhower in New York City.

Housing: II "...not fit to house cattle"


"... a survey ordered by Mayor Donald J. Connolly... disclosed that 50 per cent of Trenton's homes were fifty or more years old and that 35 per cent of the city's dwellings were substandard."

"Some of our dwellings,' the Mayor said, 'are fully occupied, yet they are not fit to house cattle, much less human beings.'"

"A survey of some of the worst sections this week found scores of homes lacking toilet facilities and proper heating equipment, many of them within a stone's throw of the State House. Others are firetraps of the worst sort. In some tenements broken sewer pipes have long been ignored.

"A whole rear room had been torn off one house by its occupants, who explained that they needed wood last winter to keep warm. The result was to turn an indoor lavatory into an outdoor toilet. Dozens of homes, although fully occupied, have boarded-up windows, and a number of rear yards are virtually knee-deep in refuse."—Trenton, N. J., Aug. 8, to the *New York Times*.

The Logic of Liberty



Dwight Macdonald's accurate profile of Roger Baldwin (*The New Yorker*, July 11 and 18), "The Defense of Everybody," leads to reflections on the current state of affairs in civil liberties.

Macdonald traces Baldwin's pilgrimage from the far west of politics to a "homogenized" pan-Americanism embracing everything as far east as MacArthur. World War I conscientious objector, anarchist, founder of the American Civil Liberties Union, editor of a volume of Kropotkin's "Revolutionary Pamphlets," Baldwin, in the last stages of his progress, acquiesced in the deportation of the Japanese from California in 1942, abandoned the conscientious objectors in World War II, undercut the campaign for amnesty for all draft-law violators, and whitewashed the American occupation in Japan. But whatever damage Baldwin did to civil liberties in his later years, it is done; he is no longer director of the ACLU, and unhappily his migration across the political spectrum is not exceptional enough to detain us.

Of more importance is the change the years have wrought in the ACLU, and in the panorama of the civil liberties.

Macdonald quotes Clifford Forster, the Union's special counsel, as saying: "The Union began outside the legal system and in opposition to the government. But in recent years it has gradually become assimilated into both."

For his own part, Macdonald observes: "Our politics, like our milk, are now homogenized. American capitalists compete with liberals in supporting the Bill of Rights—with a few reservations on both sides about national security in wartime . . ."

"Today even protests against the social system have become part of that system . . . and the Department of Justice has its Civil Rights Division, which defends the rights of some citizens while the rest of the department is busy taking away the rights of others . . ."

"The old order changeth, yielding place to the new; the moralist is replaced by the specialist; Jeremiah and Savonarola have given way to the technicians of worthy causes."

I. Liberty—Legal and Illegal

When we think of "civil liberties," we think first of the "constitutional rights." During the Twenties and Thirties, these were the center of concern. A wall of local ordinances, arbitrary law authorities, professional vigilantes, stood between the union organizers and radical "agitators" and the audiences they sought to reach; often enough, instead of a wall it was a club or a rope. Company towns and injunction-judges mocked the workers' freedom of association. In breaking down these barriers, and in protecting people from arbitrary police authority, from search and seizure, from extreme censorship, from legal frame-ups—in all these spheres the ACLU, and the persons it has bestirred to action directly and indirectly, has had notable if far from complete success. So long as our liberties consist only of restraints on government, so long as

power and monopoly dominate our society, this vigilance, coupled with assertion and exercise of these liberties, are our protection. Neither the Department of Justice, nor the Supreme Court Harry Truman bequeathed to posterity, are going to look out for us.

But there is also another kind of liberty—one on which there are no constitutional rights to appeal to. It was, curiously and significantly, just in this kind of issue that the ACLU was born. What was legal about the refusal of conscientious objectors to serve in the Army in the first World War? What was legal about the Wobblies' and Socialists' and anarchists' violation of the sweeping laws against "sedition" and "criminal syndicalism"? What was legal about the radical opinions and activities of "aliens" when Congress had revoked their rights to these views and the Supreme Court had upheld Congress? There were illegal abuses, of course, and the lawyers could try to set technical limits, within the law, to the government's proceedings. But the proceedings were *legal*, and liberty was *illegal*.

From the perspective in vogue now—when conditions are very similar—to oppose such a repressive legality, to defend the illegal liberty, is futile and possibly dangerous. Certainly it is a losing fight! Yet in that earlier period the ACLU, and similar groups, strove by publicity and education to persuade people that these proceedings, though "legal," though established by Congress and validated as "constitutional," were destructive of liberty—and liberty was more important than law. What a splendid losing struggle! When the war was over and the hysteria died down, Americans were ashamed of the barbarities inflicted on the COs, they were ashamed of the sedition indictments and the deportations. (Nowadays, the blackest page in the history of American civil liberties, the deportation of the Japanese from California, could be duplicated without a moral qualm.)

Today, we have more security in our "constitutional rights"—but we have fewer of them! And such as remain are vitiated. The Supreme Court upholds the "investigative powers" of Congress. It upholds the laws aimed at the Communist Party.¹ Who would dream of challenging again the constitutionality of conscription?² Certain details can be carried to the courts—in this way, protection under the Fifth Amendment was affirmed—but against the system as a whole, there is no legal appeal. By and large, it is not a time for lawyers, it is not a time for "homogenized liberals" and "technicians of worthy causes." It is a time for the defense of the illegal.

¹These prosecutions go on and on. On August 25 in Pittsburgh, Federal Judge March sentenced five Communists to five years imprisonment under the Smith Act. One, 73 years old, is to be sent to a prison with facilities for tuberculars.

²Since passage of the 1948 conscription law, a "preliminary survey" shows, 350 conscientious objectors, excluding Jehovah's Witnesses, have been arrested, and at least 227 sentenced to prison. Most sentences exceed two years. (*The Reporter* of the National Service Board for Religious Objectors, Sept., 1953.) This is to say nothing of the COs the deprivation of whose liberty is limited to assignment to "alternative service."

II. Law vs. Liberty

What is legal today?

For having written a book, a man may be summoned before a Congressional Committee and required to state his political views, or declare that frank testimony might end in prosecution, or go to jail. (Did the author ask the State Department to buy his book? He might retort—*caveat emptor*.)

For having made errors in testimony, a man is in danger of prosecution for perjury. (Or for making what are thought to be errors.) To be sure, to convict it must be shown that the errors are willful; but a jury can do no better than make vague guesses about the state of a man's memory and the state of his intent.

For having attended a public political meeting, a person's name may be supplied to the FBI for its files, by policemen who note down the license plates.

We choose at random, and instances as likely to affect non-Communists as Communists, non-radicals as radicals.

To get evidence against Communists, to establish the identity of all Communists, to root Communists out of the professions, all very "legal" aims, the government exposes every citizen to the same threat. Every citizen who expresses an idea to which Communists agree—which is to say everyone—every person who is unorthodox in an unorthodox way (perhaps he has late parties at his house every week—this has happened), every person who is in bad with a single informer or hysterical patriot, runs the risk of "exposure," public embarrassment, a cloud of suspicion, and possibly the familiar graver consequences.

In this atmosphere, only conservative opinions can survive, only the hardest souls will take the risk of unconformity.

None of this is news. We were writing about it in *Resistance* three, four, five and more years ago. Liberals are generally aware of the facts. (Though it is easy to overestimate the number of people who see them, or are willing to see them. The majority of newspaper editors on the committee that considered the Wechsler-McCarthy case could see no "clear and present danger.") Unhappily it is no longer gloomy prophecy; and it is no longer enough to perceive it and warn against it—but to attack its sources. And these sources are not merely McCarthy.

III. Liberty to Be Stupid, Liberty to Conspire

The liberty of each of us depends on the liberty of all of us. Now this is even a rather hackneyed idea that is always very easy to understand in the case of a very remote country; but it is a vanishing number of Americans who are willing to act, in America, on its consequences.

The liberals who want to deny free speech, free conspiracy, free association, freedom to work at their professions, etc., to Communists, and yet do not like McCarthyism, are in the position of a man who eats meat but complains about the murder of cows in the slaughterhouses. To be sure, there is justice in their complaint that the McCarthys are careless about distinguishing between New Dealers and Communists, and are grinding many unpleasant axes. But it is utter nonsense to pass laws against Communists and not enforce them—as the liberals sometimes seem to want. If the laws, if the purposes of the laws, are to be served, then the government must send its stool-pigeons into private organizations, it must use a broad

concept of perjury, it must take down license numbers, and do many another unpleasant thing.

To inquire into the opinions of one man, it to deprive every man of a part of his liberty. A man who is "free" to speak in public, but dares not for fear of what may befall him tomorrow or twenty years from tomorrow, enjoys a very peculiar sort of freedom. Or suppose the speaker dares, he is a bold type. The people who are "free" to go hear him but dare not go lest no good come of it, are also enjoying a funny kind of freedom. (For an obvious parallel, freedom of religion in Russia will do.)

This compels a choice: either accept the consequences, the impairment of the liberty of us all—and this is already the fact—or give up the objectives. The second choice means, to grant to everyone, Communists included, complete freedom of speech, freedom from harassment, freedom of association. And none of these rights can be secure, unless everyone has *privacy* of opinion—even if it is absurd, even if it is conspiratorial.

As anti-Communists of long standing—as persons who were anti-Communist in the days of the Soviet-American alliance—we unhesitatingly choose liberty for everyone, including the Communists. We believe that those persons who care seriously about the civil liberties must begin to take a clear stand, not only against the "excesses" of McCarthyism, but against the aims and methods of the Smith Act and every succeeding act of repression in the last dozen years.

Old soldiers. . . .

"In 1947, General MacArthur invited Baldwin to visit Japan and inspect the state of civil liberties under the Occupation . . . He and MacArthur took to each other right away. 'We saw the problem of civil rights eye to eye,' Baldwin recalls . . . Someone in Tokyo asked him, 'How did you get in here? Aren't you some kind of revolutionist?' 'Yes,' answered Baldwin, 'and this is the greatest revolution I've seen, and General MacArthur is leading it.'

"After he got home, he wrote . . . several magazine articles that recall his 1934 Soviet Russia Today outburst in their manner of reporting seemingly unfavorable data without taking a particularly gloomy view of it. He recorded MacArthur's quelling of certain Communist-led strikes and quoted approvingly his retort to a Russian general: 'Since when has the Soviet government permitted a strike?' The trip also changed Baldwin's ideas about generals. 'Imagine an anti-militarist like me falling for MacArthur,' he says, wondering. 'Why, on civil liberties he's as liberal as I am!'"

—Dwight Macdonald, "The Defense of Everybody," in *The New Yorker*.

IV. Pragmatic McCarthyism

There is a type of liberal, for instance Arthur Schlesinger in the current issue of the *Progressive*, who knows what the Inquisition is doing to our society, and is anxious to proportion the sacrifice of liberty to the necessity. Polemicizing against a McCarthyite, Schlesinger urges that the crisis is past—American Communism is broken—and anti-Communist measures should be viewed in this light. For those attempting to trim the liberal course, this is an attractive position, but lamentable.

The trouble is, first, that the people who have the power to turn the Inquisition off and on—if anybody has that power—are not liberals and do not have any concern for liberty. In the second place, the courts do not recognize laws that vary with expediency—they have no truck with a "clear and present danger" that comes and goes according to the political analyses of the liberal magazines. In the third place, the habit of liberty is a frail thing, and when it is lost for a time, people grow alarmingly accustomed to being without it. (The civil liberties are, after all, significant directly only in the lives of *non-conformists*.)

Liberties under government must be clear, unambiguous, legally plain, or they are at the mercy of every policeman, magistrate and investigator. Once the pursuit and prosecution of Communists were legalized, once the appropriate agencies were authorized, a force was set going that will not be turned on and off as some objective "necessity" requires. After all, it was factors other than strict "necessity" that set it in motion. If it is turned on and off, it is in accordance with another order of necessity—political or diplomatic expediency.

If it is answered that, once the Inquisition and its accessory agencies are *fait accompli*, the practical thing is to restrain them opportunistically, we answer that this but confirms in their error all those people who believe in security through repression. It is a time that cries out for forthrightness—for a stand like England's liberal and left intellectuals took, in 1945, when the government prosecuted the editors of the anarchist periodical *Freedom*. (It is not evident, incidentally, that England, because of its fairly consistent "complacency" toward Communism, is in danger of a Communist coup.)

What a losing struggle it would be, given the ways of thinking that prevail in America, to stand for liberty firmly, unyielding, unpragmatically! Instead the dominant liberal mode is exemplified by the present director of the ACLU, who speaks of the "false campaign" of the Communists "to prove that America does not practice its cherished principles." Does America practice its cherished principles? True or False? "Not as bad as Russia!" Of course not—but does America practice its cherished principles?

It would be a glorious losing struggle.

V. Liberty for What?

Even so—and all that precedes is essential—even so, the right to speak and publish and assemble, free from every kind of reprisal, is meaningless if it is not a vital part of the functioning of society. There was a time when the ideal of the ruling classes was the *ignorance* of the masses, and the fight for free speech was a fight to break down this ignorance. But the ideal toward which America has tended in recent years is that of keeping the masses supplied with

. . . . Maligned bureaucrats

"U.S. Seizes a Columbia Professor for Questioning as 'Security Case'; Dr. Arciniegas, Ex-Minister of Education in Colombia, Held on Return from France"—headline, *New York Times*, Sept. 17.

"Professor Freed from Ellis Island; Immigration Man Apologizes but Washington Knows of No Order to Release Colombian"—headline, *New York Times*, Sept. 18.

"The only thing approaching interrogation, Dr. Arciniegas said . . . was a question as to whether he had been critical of the relations between the United States and some South American countries.

"The Colombian educator . . . said he replied in the affirmative."—*N. Y. Times news story*.

"Communist propagandists will certainly make use of this incident in their false campaign to prove that America does not practice its cherished principles."—telegram from Director Patrick Malin to the Attorney General, quoted in the *New York Post*, Sept. 18.

false and incomplete knowledge. (This makes it possible for a certain degree of civil liberties to exist, in futility.)

The means for achieving the false knowledge are the dailies, the magazines, the radio, the TV and the rest. In a society of power and monopoly, the ideas and facts broadcast by the mass media are of only two types: (1) those approved and paid for by the possessors of power and property; (2) those *already believed* by the conservative mass audience, and which this audience will pay for and approve. By and large, what fits one type fits the other—and in both cases it is the false and incomplete knowledge of ultra-conservatism. Within these media, un-conforming ideas are just so many dead scripts and still-born ideas, and outside them they are musketry in the age of everyone knows what.

There are, of course, those who propose legal remedies even for such deep evils. Unhappily, and rather glaringly, the evil is inherent in any power and monopoly society which has reached a certain technological stage. Already, the normal means of intellectual progress, of education, may have broken down decisively. A meaningful defense of this education and progress—or, more accurate, "renewal"—becomes thinkable only if the core of the present society, its power and monopoly structure, is attacked. This, we think, is the conclusion to which anyone who takes the question of civil liberties seriously, is necessarily driven.

David Wieck

LETTERS

To the editor:

I have just finished John Dickinson's article ("The Nazi Complex," August Resistance) and it has disturbed me a great deal.

Naturally, it is assumed among anarchists that there is no "perverse psychology of the Germans," any more than there is a special perverse psychology that makes Americans do the things they do, or makes Russians support the slave labor camps. No! What one expects to find in Resistance is discussion of the "normal psychology" that permits such activities. The average human beings that Dickinson writes about naturally didn't engage in any activities as horrible as the SS men at Auschwitz. But if these normal average citizens had been transferred from keeping books in the local gas company to keeping books in the death camps, they would have gone, and kept their books—or done even worse. For after all, "how many people, anywhere, will give up their source of livelihood for a principle?"

I am sure I am prejudiced in this matter, but I cannot see how the exclusion of Jews from Country Clubs is in any way the same moral horror as the extermination of 6,000,000 Jews by the Nazis. And if the same people acquiesce in both, then what hope is there?

Also. That all Germans did not actually kill Jews does not mean that they are unrelated to the crimes. The little businessman took over the Jewish property after its owners had disappeared, the workers filled the jobs, the doctors experimented with live Jews instead of guinea pigs, the guards at Dachau murdered, but where is the moral distinction? On each level the guilt was whatever the potential of the level.

I think my reaction can be summed up in this fashion: Perhaps what the Nazis did was not unique, but an intensified version of the sicknesses of our age. If people can live so comfortably in such moral and human foulness, then there is no basis for the statement that anarchism, the belief that man can live in freedom, complies with the best knowledge of mankind ("Essentials of Anarchism"). It does not comply with the knowledge of Nazi exterminations, with Frau Heidi's memory that her experiences with the BDM were pleasant, or with Herr Mittelsdoerfer's belief in the agricultural laborers. It does not comply with Gert Berliner's dead parents, of the treatment of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising.

It raises the problem of the basic nature of human beings, it opens up enormous festering sores of guilt and shame and horror. I know that these problems are not answered yet, but I would expect to find them raised in Resistance.

Stuart

I don't want to be opportunistic, but the more I think about Stuart's letter, the more it seems to me that my article was in some senses successful. At least as far as

Stuart is concerned, it has evoked highly pertinent reactions. These are centered around two points. First, he charges me with failing in moral indignation because I speak in the same breath of the extermination camps and the exclusion of Jews from country clubs in the U.S. Then, "if people can live so comfortably in such moral and human foulness . . ."

(1) Moral indignation. I haven't arrived at a final (for me) conclusion on this. Certainly I don't think I'm devoid of moral feelings, in this or in any other regard, and I believe my article supplies evidence for this. Whatever these feelings are, however, they do differ both in quality and quantity from Stuart's. Enough so, that we fail to communicate. E.g., he says, "What one expects to find is a discussion of the normal psychology that permits such activities." But I think this "normal psychology" was an important aspect of what I was discussing. Stuart wants a qualitatively different kind of article, dealing more explicitly with the immorality and amorality of the Germans and the Nazis. It goes without saying that such an approach is necessary . . . but here again, I thought I did this, to a degree anyway.

What is the core of an amoral action? Where does one aim the shafts of his indignation? At the social structure, and the cultural distortions of Man. But then the quantity becomes important, because there's no point in attacking the system unless you can see its proportions with clarity. Fervor proves absolutely nothing about the usefulness of one's approach, and it can vitiate an approach by obscuring one's vision. This is old hat, but I believe it's true. Just as it's true that the great anger is but a step from the great despair. And I think Stuart's letter is a case in point.

(2) People can live pretty comfortably amid foulness. There are, indeed, few who will give up their livelihood for a principle; and often enough the principle which brings forth such sacrifice is one that Stuart would consider bad. Surely the anarchists have faced this! There's no need to reject religion so ardently that you fail to see that there is something corresponding to "the problem of Evil." Mind you, I reject religion, and I think the religious formulation is misleading and wrong. But let's face it: there's something there.

So what? It seems to me that if "the problem of Evil" is analyzed, the analysis supports most of the major contentions of anarchism—though simultaneously, it throws a stronger light on certain relatively discouraging facets of Man than anarchists and other people of good will would care to see. It'll be a long, long, long time before the revolution comes about, and man may blow himself off the earth before it happens. Not only will it be a long time, but the nature of development probably cannot be predicted or foreseen with any assurance: when the patterns of Man are seen in both time and space, variation within a limited sector becomes an insecure basis for prognosis. It is undoubtedly a source of hope that most of the absolutes of the absolutists are theoretical trash, but the trap can be fallen into from a variety of sides.

Stuart speaks of the "festering sores of guilt and shame and horror" which will open up if people can live comfortably with such moral and human foulness. But men have and are. If this is reason for despair, than anarchism was doomed from the word go. But to draw such a conclusion seems to me to read the book wrongly. To say that men can and do live in a certain way is not to say that they must.

But the "problem of Evil" is perhaps greater than we thought it was. As Stuart says, there is a sickness in the world. I think latter-day anarchism may have established the etiology. I think it may come closer than other ideologies to an idea of what health may be like. But I don't think it has the cure, and I doubt that most anarchists are fundamentally willing to let the disease take its course.

The situation demands a humility, both in respect to the cures and nostrums which are everywhere hawked, as well as in respect to descriptions of the disease . . .

John Dickinson

The anarchist "cure," since it depends on people, is regrettably slow. But the good doctor applies the best medicines he has, and hopes for the best.

As to the rest, in the next issue.

DTW

BOOKS

"Prescription for Rebellion," by Robert Lindner, N. Y., Rinehart, 1952, \$3.50

The first half of *Prescription for Rebellion* is a telling critique of current practice in psychology-psychiatry-psychoanalysis. The neurotic, the psychotic, says Lindner, are not "sick," as the "adjustment" doctors claim. A sick society's demands for conformity and renunciation are making their lives miserable, they need help; instead they are analyzed and educated into submitting, "adjusting," conforming, renouncing. The painful symptoms yield—to the deadness of adjustment.

It must be 30 years since Trigant Burrow first inveighed against the error of psychoanalysts in thinking that the ubiquitous social neurosis is psychic health—but the point needs making again and again. Lindner exaggerates, he is sometimes unjust, but in arguing for a new, anti-adjustment direction in psychotherapy he is arguing a strong case.

There follows the second, lame half of the book. I will not pause over Lindner's Cook's Tour of History. He has the mania of Philosophy of Civilization, and he works up a mishmash of *Totem and Taboo* and *The Revolt of the Masses*, plus odd bits and pieces, to produce in the end the familiar Ortega y Gasset-Toynbee goblin of the Mass Man, the Proletarian. Lindner is not a philosopher, and he may be pardoned for repeating other people's errors, meretricious ones at that.

But he is a psychologist, he titles his "prescription" "A Revolutionist's Handbook," he talks constantly of rebellion, he denounces the "adjustment" and "revisionist" psychologists. So he must be held to account when his own "prescription" turns out to be merely another kind of adjustment.

We must have rebels, make rebels, says Lindner; to this end we must work upon individuals (children, patients, readers) and upon the "social climate." This has a fine sound. But what are the rebel's characteristics? We should "breed," he says, for intelligence. *Training the*

intelligence is his formula for creating rebels, who should be: "aware," possessing "identity," "skeptical," "responsible," "employed," "tense." (I have omitted nothing from his list.)

Of course! But man is more than intellectual, he is passionate, he loves and hates. For all Lindner's fiery pro-instinctualism, only one instinct, the instinct to rebel, to master, to progress, really interests him.¹ The "instincts," the emotions, the Eros, that join men in communities, that unite person to person, a man to his work, a mother to her child—that give meaning to an individual's life and enrich the community—no. Lindner's free individual is a lonely man, an uncreative man (of this, later)—and a lost man.

Lindner's error, naturally, is that he "adjusts." He is adjusting to the desperate fate of the instincts in the typical childhood of our people: "... the human being in the years following birth until about the age of four or five . . . is, for the most part, a filthy savage—a biting, rending, soiling, clawing, destroying egomaniac whose body is a reservoir of hostility and aggression and whose cosmos consists of himself." (pp. 173-4). (From "for the most part" the reader might guess, as this reader did, that Lindner would acknowledge another side; no.)

Assume that this childhood is "nature," and there is precious little to build on except the intellect. But Lindner is simply adjusting to a social fact—that the love of mother and child is, among us, torn and disfigured by the mother's anxieties and rigidities, her personality and the life she lives. It is no revolutionary, anti-adjustment psychology that accepts this fact.

(For the sake of turning Lindner's "adjustment" against him, I concede what is not so: that even now, the mother-child relationship is so hateful and individualistic. Even in the worst cases, the child does love its mother, it experiences her anxieties and pleasures, her joys and sorrows; and only in the worst cases, are these capacities irrecoverable. Like most people, he has only one idea, but Ian D. Suttie, in *The Origins of Love and Hate*, finally published in America last year (Julian Press), is an invaluable corrective to the usual psychoanalytic image of childhood, especially forbidding in Melanie Klein, whom Lindner follows.)

Lindner's intellectual rebel is, of course, in grievous straits. His life can be rich, meaningful, worthy, only . . . if he is an element in man's cosmic evolution. "To be employed [to live meaningfully] is not to be productive (creatively or busily): it is, rather, to have a vocation consisting of the dedication of one's existence to evolution, to the lending of one's life consciously and conscientiously to the ongoing parade." (pp. 261-2). Talk of "creativity," says Lindner, is nonsense because few people have any "artistic talent."

All this means, is that Lindner accepts, without question (1) the banishment from adulthood of the common, not exceptional, artistic gifts of children; (2) our industrial system, which rules out craftsmanship and skill, and the exercise of initiative, responsibility and control on the part of the workers; (3) the existing political system, which denies us any voice or control in our communities. Adjust to these facts, and certainly the life of the great majority must be uncreative and sterile. What more aimless, more

¹In the critical part of the book, Lindner hammers away at the prevailing sexual mores, and their favorableness to conformism. In the constructive part, the idea of sexual freedom is mentioned once, in passing, to disparage it.

"rebellion without cause," than Lindner's appeal to be- come factors in evolution?

From the gloomy facts Lindner makes his Rebel adjust to, his ideas about the "social climate" can be foreseen. We are to try to maintain a "social climate" favorable to rebellion. But what creates a "social climate"? I do not recall seeing, in Lindner's book, the words "banks," "cor- porations," "government," "factories," "war," "army." Oh yes! He knows about "caste" and "social insecurity." But to him caste and class are states of mind, determined by "values." But what determines values? When Lindner condemns the "very existence of divisions" (p. 289) one would think he means what he says; no, he means, the opinion that divisions exist, for his "prescription" is, "solely effective against caste is the patient obliteration of stratifying boundaries that block free exchange and in- tercourse among men, and the complementary substitution of the only value deserving so to be called: the intrinsic worth of a person..." (p. 290). Class, it seems, has nothing to do with the poverty and powerlessness of the masses, or with the monopolies of power, property and privilege! So, let status and money be valued less highly, let "social and economic stability" exist—and the social problems are settled.

Characteristic of Lindner's method is to settle on "urbanization" as an element of danger; hence decentral-

ism. But the problem of cities is not only their size; it is the financial-industrial system imbedded in them. To scat- ter the cities, and not change this system, is merely... to scatter the cities.

For all his violence against clinic-bound thinking, Lind- ner has not yet escaped from the clinic.

DTW

To Our Readers

This issue inaugurates a new policy for *Resistance*. Henceforth, *Resistance* will appear every second month (October, December, February, etc.). Instead of the pre- vious emphasis on "theoretical" articles, greater space will be given to analysis of current events, current books, and matters we hope will be of greater interest to persons who are not already anarchists.

The size of each issue will be determined, roughly, by the amount of money on hand each time. For the sake of regularity, this may sometimes be as few as four pages— though we hope not!

This decision has followed considerable discussion, in- cluding suggestions from readers. It seems plain that fre- quent publication is essential to the survival of the maga- zine. It seems clear also that *Resistance* should attempt to make contact with the general group identifiable as the "anti-war anti-Communist Left," because in principle anarchism is the logical rallying-ground for this group. Monthly publication, which *Resistance* once enjoyed, is of course preferable, but at present out of the question.

Whether *Resistance* can move ahead, on the basis pro- posed, is something that will be found out. We are keenly aware, for example, of the limitation of our "outlets." We simply do not reach, often enough, the persons who would be interested in the magazine. For *Resistance* to reach outside its present circles, these channels must be found. Readers who can find for us in their localities news- stands or bookstores willing to carry *Resistance* will per- form a tremendous service.

A second crucial point is, of course, costs of printing and mailing—currently about \$75 for every four pages.

And the third critical point is the relationship of *Re- sistance* to its readers. What this relationship ought to be, is hard to define. The editors of a publication like ours are attempting to speak for—to edit a voice for—ideas shared in varying degrees by most of their readers. Ulti- mately, the responsibility for the magazine is the editors'—and to pretend otherwise, to claim that it is the "organ of a movement," would be false and demagogic. However, *Resistance* can be vital and useful only if it expresses the best thinking of anarchists—and only if there is an inter- action between its editors and readers. During the period of irregular publication, such a relationship could scarcely exist; we hope this period is over.

The list of pamphlets we have for sale, usually printed on this page, will appear henceforth only every-other-issue. With the exception of "The Iliad," all items listed in the last issue are still in stock; a complete listing, including a few additions, will be supplied on request.

FINANCIAL STATEMENT, Sept. 21, 1953

CONTRIBUTIONS

CALIFORNIA: Ocean Park: S. & S. P. 2.30;		
Vista: A. S. 0.32	\$	2.62
COLORADO: Lamar: C.D. 1.00		1.00
ILLINOIS: Springfield: E.C.B. 1.00		1.00
KANSAS: Kansas City: S.G. 10.00		10.00
MASSACHUSETTS: Arlington: K.B. 1.00;		
Greenfield: R.B. 5.40; Needham: Comrades		
(per J.R.) 2.00		8.40
MICHIGAN: Detroit: R.B. 2.00; Comrades		
(per C.B.) 100.00; Milford: H.R. 1.00		103.00
MINNESOTA: Minneapolis: R.T.D. 2.00;		
Bookstore 2.00		4.00
NEW JERSEY: Stelton: R. (per F.G.) 2.00		2.00
NEW YORK: Albany: J.R. 1.00; Flushing: M.G.		
1.00; Interlaken: R.M. 2.00; Ithaca: H.B.		
0.40; New York City: S.G. (per D.A.)		
2.00; S.D. (per C.B.) 10.00		16.40
VIRGINIA: Hampton: D. J. 0.75		0.75
WISCONSIN: Milwaukee: M.B. 3.00		3.00
CANADA: Quebec: P.W. 1.00		1.00
		\$153.17
Balance, July 6, 1953		175.12
		\$328.29
EXPENDITURES		
Cut, Vol. XI, No. 1	\$10.10	
P.O. Box Rent	6.00	
Postage, Vol. XI, No. 2	35.00	
Printing, Vol. XI, No. 2	196.40	
Total	\$247.50	247.50
Balance, Sept. 21, 1953	\$	80.79